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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the incentives provided by the Italian Social Security System (SS) to
supply labor. Italy is an interesting example in this context as: (1) fertility rates are very low while
life expectancy has improved dramatically over the past decades; (2) the SS Program is extremely
generous to retirees by providing very high replacement rates; (3) virtually all retirement income is
in the form of SS benefits; (4) the existence of an early retirement provision, which attracts no
actuarial penalty, greatly distorts choices in favor of early retirement.
This paper addresses the above issue by first documenting the stylized facts of the labor
market and the SS provisions. A simulation model is then developed to better understand the
incentive effects of SS on current cohorts of retirees. This model proposes two measures for
incentives: the accrual rate (i.e. the percentage change in Social Security Wealth) from postponing
retirement and the implicit tax/subsidy (via SS entitlements) on potential earnings from working an
additional year. The simulation results show that the Italian SS Program provides a strong incentive
to retire early and the age-implicit tax profile fits very closely with the estimated hazards out of the
labor force. Additional evidence of the existence of behavioral responses to SS policy changes lends








Italyis now experiencing one of the lowest fertility rates among developed countries while life
expectancy has improved dramatically over the past few years1 This aging process is partly
counterbalanced by a significant increase in the size and frequency of immigration flows into the
country. However, even the most optimistic scenarios suggest that this inflow will not be enough to
revert the demographic pattern shown by the data. In particular, Figures 1, 2 and 3 show a dramatic
increase in the share of older people and in the dependency ratio over past decades2. Furthermore,
the positive effects of the baby-boom generation were already fading by 1984 and the ratio of old
people and very young people to the working age population stayed roughly constant after that year
(Figure 3) Demographic projections suggest that by year 2030 each adult individual will support
04 elderly individuals and this rate may increase to 0.56 by 2050 (Figure 4)3
This demographic trend is coupled with a sizeable SS Program. In 1995 approximately 17% of GD!'
was devoted to old-age and other public assistance outlays4. Estimates of the size of the SS
Administration liabilities for the payment of future benefit rights in terms of net SS wealth amount to
300% of GDP in j9935 From the point of view of households this corresponds to a large share of
their assets being in the form of Social Security wealth: estimates based on micro data suggest that,
on average, 55 wealth holdings are as large as private wealth holdings6. Not surprisingly, these
stylized facts have prompted economists to investigate more closely both the financial viability of the
Social Security System and the effects of the incentives provided by the SS program on households'
behavior. As a result two major reforms have been implemented in very recent years aimed at
reducing the level of benefits and restricting eligibility criteria for retirees.
One of the key elements both in evaluating future budget outlays and in assessing the impact of SS
on households choices is the effect of the retirement decision on the labor market. In fact,
4understanding the link between SS-related incentives and labor supply can help to explain some
features of the labor market structure (e.g. the increasing detachment of older people from the labor
force). This in turn provides some idea of how the budget will be affected by a given labor market
configuration, i.e. by the relationship between the number of 55 tax payers versus benefit recipients.
Italy is a very interesting example in this context. First, because virtually all retirement income is
provided to individuals by the SS as pension funds and private annuities play a negligible role.
Second. replacement rates were (until 1995) very high (roughly 80% of last wage) and therefore the
retirement decision involved a large fraction of the household's resources In particular, when
considering whether to work an additional year the individual sets against the earnings of one extra
year almost the same amount of income not collected as 55 benefits. Third, the existence of an early
retirement provision, which attracts no actuarial penalty, greatly distorts choices in favor of early
retirement Finally, different groups in the population belong to different SS Funds characterized by
different benefit payoffs and eligibility criteria. This causes redistribution betweeen individuals and,
given the variety of incentives provided across these groups, it generates different behavioral
responses to policy changes (e.g. the recent reforms), which can be exploited for applied economic
analysis.
This paper addresses the above issues by first documenting the stylized facts characterizing
the labor market both over the recent past and over the life cycle of individuals (Part I). Part 11
describes the structure of the Italian SS Program and summarizes the relevant institutional details.
Part III is devoted to a simulation model designed to better understand the incentive effects of SS
on current cohorts of retirees. Part IV draws some conclusions.
Part I. Labor market behavior of older persons in Italy
5The Italian labor market has been characterized by a declining attachment to the labor force of older
persons, buta differentpattern is observed for men and women. After World War lithe Italian SS
system became increasingly more generous, particularly with regard to early retirement There is now
a consistent body of evidence that this increased generosity is closely related with a reduction in
household savings (Rossi Visco, 1995; Attanasio-l3rugiavini, 1996). This prompts the question of
whether observed changes in labor supply behavior could be explained by the growth of the Italian
SS program over those years. An interesting twist in the investigation of this issue in the Italian case
is that, due to the lack of actuarial penalties on early retirement, the workers exhibiting these trends
may still be relatively young.
The historical and contemporary facts presented in this section are drawn from a number of
different data sources. These are summarized in Appendix I.
Historical 1 e,id
Figures 8 and 9 map out the labor force participation rates of men and women of different age
groups since 1958. Four age groups are selected: 40-50, 50-60, 60-65 and 65 plus7.
From these aggregate figures a marked difference emerges between the labor market behavior of
older men in the age groups 60 plus. Figure 8 indicates that for these groups, participation starts low
(e.g. 60% in 1958 for the group 60-64) and declines sharply (to about 30% in 1994 for the group
60-64). These figures can be contrasted with the 50-60 group, which is characterized by a greater
attachment (90% share in 1958) and an almost comparable drop (to about 70%) in recent years.
6The same distinction can be drawn for female labor force participation (Figure 9): for older
women participation declines slightly butsteadily,whilefor younger women higher and
increasing participationobserved. The decline in the LFP rate observed for older men in recent
years is not so sharp for women because of an increase over time of participation in the LF which is
more marked for younger cohorts1.
In order to explore possible correlations between the labor market evidence and the
developments in the SS program a number of graphs are presented that document the increasing
generosity of the SS system over time.
A first graph looks at the share of the population over age 30 receiving benefits (Figure l0).
These are distinguished in two time series: a first series shows the share of old-age 55 benefits
(inclusive of early retirement benefits) and benefits to survivors paid to the population in the age
group 30-plus the second series is based on the share of old age 55 benefits, survivor benefits and
disability benefits (Dl) paid to the population of the same age group. It should be pointed out
straight away that in this graph, and in all the following historical graphs, although the title reads
benefit recipients" it is actually the number of benefits which is recorded, as the number of
recipients is not generally available. The two figures may differ significantly as each person may
receive more than one type of benefit10. Both lines increase sharply from 1960 up to the first half of
the 70s, to follow a more moderate trend thereafter. What is striking is the incidence of DI benefits
in this group of the population and how this feature evolves over time. However, the two series tend
to converge for most recent years as screening for DI benefits eligibility gets tighter, e.g. in 1993
roughly 14% of DI benefits were paid out to this age group".The number of all SS-related benefits
for this age group was roughly 40% in 1975 and 50% in 1994.
Figure 11 shows the change in generosity over time by plotting the aggregate replacement
rate (for the Private Sector Employees fund only). This is available for years since 1970 and it is
much lower than the "theoretical" replacement rate (roughly 8O%) because it is obtained as the
7average benefit level (all types of benefits) over the average of earnings computed on the basis of the
payments made to the SS Administration. There is a clear pattern of increase over the last few
decades, with a huge jump between 1980 and 1985.
Labor Market Behavior in 1995
In order to explore more recent facts on the labor market and to analyze patterns of labor
force attachment and benefit receipt over the life cycle, it may be usefUl to turn to micro evidence. 1
use the Bank of Italy Survey (SHIW) which is a nationally representative survey of Italian
households based on questions about consumption, saving, demographic structure and labor supply
asked to each member of the household (see Data Appendix I). The responses given by each adult
member of the household concern current labor supply behavior as well as some retrospective
information on employment. Unfortunately, the whole work history of each worker cannot be
reconstructed as there are no questions about spells of unemployment or previous detachments from
the labor force. I exploit the data both in its cross sectional component and its panel component fbr
the years l989l99ll993i2. For the graphs contained in this section cross sectional data is better
suited: I decided to work with the three cross sections, rather than just use the 1993 one, as the
year 1993 is considered to have been affected by a brief, yet sharp, recession which could provide
misleading results. The panel dimension is used to construct the hazard rate out of labor force to be
discussed in Part Ill of the paper.
The age pattern of participation for men and women is given in Figure 12. There is a
striking difference between the two curves. They both peter out after the age of 60, but while for
men we observe a participation close to unity at age 45 which runs down to 0.44 by age 60
(normal retirement age under the pre-1992 legislation), women have a participation rate close to
S0.5 at age 45 whichdecreases steadily afterwards. The most precipitousdrop for males seems to
occur between age 55 and age 62: early retirement seems a natural explanation of this finding.
Figure 13 shows how men allocate their time among different activities as they age. There are
four categories of activity: employment, unemployment, disability and retirement. While disability
insurance characterizes a non-negligible fraction of men at all ages, there is a downward trend in the
numbers of the employed population which exactly parallels the labor force attachment profile'3.
The age pattern of the share of the retired is most striking: retirement absorbs a huge share of men
in a relatively short time, starting with approximately 1% at age 50 to reach 70% at age 6614.Figure
14 shows the results of the same split for women: the underlying trends are very different from the
ones observed for men: while the share of employed women starts low and declines steadily over
time, the share of retired women grows dramatically over time and reaches a peak at age 65. E.g. at
age 50 a negligible fraction have retired while at age 65 roughly 50% have quit work, mainly
reflecting a different statutory retirement age for men and women. Disability insurance is claimed by
a non-neglible fraction of women, starting at age 50 and continuing until advanced old age. It should
be stressed that all graphs are much below the value of 100%, as many women are not engaged in
paid working activities during their life cycle15.
Income Sources of Older Persons
Figure 15 plots SS and Dl recipiency for men and it shows a marked increase, over the life
cycle, of SS benefits and, to a lesser extent, of other public assistance benefits. In Figure 16 this
aspect is further investigated by looking at the percent of men and women receiving a SS benefit'6.
This share grows rapidly after age 55: between the ages 50 and 59 the percentage is higher for
women (who are more likely to benefit from a survivor pension), after that age-interval there is a
rather stable gender gap, The growing importance of SS over the life cycle is confirmed by Figure
917, which shows how the share of family income coming from earnings declines rapidly after age 55,
the share of income from capital remains relatively stable, and there is a corresponding increase in
SS benefits and public transfers'1.
Part H: Key Featuresof theItalianSocial SecuritySystem
History of the 55 System in Italy
Old-age insurance originated in Italy in the public sector in the 19thcenturyfor employees in the
Army, while private sector blue collar workers had their first Fund set up in 1889 (it was ifilly funded
and non mandatory). By 1960 the "NationalInstitute JbrSocial Security-INPS'wascollecting
mandatory 55 payroll taxes from a large share of private sector employees (under the heading
PrivateSec/or Employees Fund-FPLD)as well as from an increasing number of the self-employed
(workers in agnculture and commerce). Hence INPS, and particularly the Private Sector Employees
Fund EPLI), established itself as the main SS Fund Administration in the country, followed by the
Public Sector Employees Fund18. However, many other groups of workers kept (or set up) their own
independent Funds, each group taking the view that they should have their own special conditions.
Hence, it was at a very early stage that the SS Program took the form of a patchwork of independent
schemes, typically characterized by different rules concerning payroll taxes, benefit pay out and
eligibility requirements.
While the introduction of a PAYG financing method had long been advocated, it is only in 1969 that
the financial distress of the fUnded schemes caused by the events of World War II and the desire to
set up a modern welfare state, finally led to a move toward a PAYG system for the major funds.
Almost simultaneously three fUrther important changes were introduced for the Private Sector
10Employees Fund: (I) benefit computation became of a "final salary" type (average of the last five
years of employment, as explained below) in place of the previous career average measure; (2) a
means-tested income maintenance scheme was introduced for each individual over 65 not covered
by old-age insurance (the so called pensi one soda/c); (3) SS benefits became automatically linked to
a price growth index. Finally the early retirement option was introduced for private sector
employees: this would allow a retiree to claim old age benefits conditional upon having "completed"
35 years of SS tax payments, but with no constraint on age. It should be added that the early
retirement option had been available to government employees since 1956: throughout the 60's and
70's it was made even more generous for this group, as men could claim early retirement benefit
having only made 20 years' SS tax payments, while married women needed to contribute to the
Public Sector Employees Fund for as little as IS years. The Public sector also received a preferential
treatment in an other relevant respect: benefit computation was based on a 'pure final salary" ri
place of an average of the last 5 years' earnings. More recently (1976) SS benefits for private sector
employees were automatically linked to real wage growth as well as price growth.
These facts show that, after World War II, Acts of Parliament enacted piecemeal changes
which went almost invariably in the direction of increasing generosity, with no concern about the
long-term effects of these amendements. The Italian experience seems even more peculiar
considering that for 40 years this trend continued uninterrupted and then two major reforms were
passed by Parliament within a period of three years. both aimed at improving the SS budget. The first
in 1992 (referred to as the Amato-Reform) and the second in 1995 (known as the Dini-Reform)
11Current Features of the 55 System
Inthis section I describe in detail the legislation governing the SS system in 1992. In fact, the
evidence illustrated in Part I concerns the features of the SS system before the reforms. I will then
provide only a brief overview of the system after the reforms
The Italian SS system relies on three "pillars": (i) mandatory old age insurance, also
providing insurance to survivors and disability benefits; (ii) pension finds and (iii) private annuities
The first covers the majority of the working population (almost all private sector employees) and is
financed through a PAYG (Pay-As-You-Go)19 method, while the remaining forms of insurance
provide additional coverage outside (or, in a few cases, substitutes for) the public program. Pension
finds are generally fully fi.inded and non mandatory (unless they substitute the public program, as
happens for employees in some banks and financial institutions).
In this study I consider the SS system to be a mandatory public insurance program collecting
payroll taxes both from employers and employees to provide old-age benefits, benefits to survivors
and disability insurance to its members20. I disregard pension finds and private annuities as they play
a negligible roleS The SS program is based on a number of Institutions administering public
pensions. A vast majority of the population is insured with the NationalInst itute forSocialSecurity
(INPS). Thisis itself responsible for a number of separate and independent finds, the most
important one is the FPLD(Private Sector Employees Fund).Although a description of the TNPS-
FPLDgivesa fairly good idea of the system as a whole, it should be borne in mind that a wide
variety of cases actually exists, Table Alsummarizessome of the main indicators for the
private sector employees find (IINPS-FPLD),the publicsector employees finds,andthe self-
employed INPS-managedfind22,
12Table Al shows clearly that [NPSprovidesinsurance to a large fraction of the working
population; publicsectoremployees account for only 15% of total INPS workers and 20% of the
INPS-FPLD group.
PayrollS'S taxes
The inflow of resources into the system comes from the employers' contributions and employees'
contributions: when outlays exceed revenue the deficit is financed by the Central Government which
has come under increasing pressure to pay for pensions. For example, it is estimated that the
theoretical equilibrium payroll tax (i.e. the payroll tax which would balance the budget) was, in 1991,
between 35% and 42% according to whether frill imputation is made for administrative costs or not
This is much higher than the actual payroll tax (264% in 1991): the difference is an estimate of the
tax levied on the entire population of income-tax payers in order to finance pensions22.
The payroll tax is unevenly shared between employer and employee. For the INPS-FPLD, the total
payroll tax was 24.51% of gross earnings: 7,15% falling on the employee. In 1995 this grew to
27.17%, of which 8.34% was paid by the worker23. In contrast, SS taxes for public sector employees
and the self-employed have been (and still are) much lower. A frirther 7.41% should be added in the
private sector for a "severance pay ffind" referred to as T.F.R.. This is retained by the employer and
builds up in a find, directly managed by the employer, which provides a lump sum benefit at the time
of retirement. I will discuss in more detail this provision in a separate section; however, it should be
said that an additional 0,8% tax is related to the TFR provision in a complex fashion. This additional
08% SS tax is paid by the employer on a monthly basis and it relates mainly to health insurance
provision for retirees (it goes to the National Health Service) hence it does not contribute in any way
to the standard SS provisions nor does it accrue to the Severance Pay Fund. However, at the end of
13the year, the employer takes from his employees' TFR find a rebate equivalent to the additional tax
he paid, which is therefore effectively paid by the employees
The tax base is not capped: this is a point long debated in the literature, as SS benefits are capped.
There is a limit to earnings under which the SS tax due stays constant: in 1995 SS tax had to be paid
on at least 720 thousand Lit. of yearly earnings, (which is approximately 3% of mean individual
earnings of that year and is below the value of the bottom 5% percent of the distribution of
earnings)24. This limit is known as the 'minimum amount subject to SS tax'.
Eligibility
Eligibility requirements are met when a man reaches age 60 (a woman 55) and has
contributed for at least 15 years25. However the early retirement option often makes the age-
requirement irrelevant as a worker in the private sector can claim early retirement benefits at any age
if 35 years' tax payments have been completed. For a male public sector employee 20 years of tax
payments are required (15 years for a married woman26). In general, a year of work is completed if
52 weeks of SS tax payments have been recorded by the SS Administration. However, since 1984,
only yearly earnings above a threshold (e.g. 13 million Lit. in 1995, approximately 37% of mean
earnings) count as full: lower earnings lead to a proportional reduction in the recorded number of
weeks27. This limit is known as "minimum eligibility level", A relevant aspect in discussing incentives
to labor supply provided by the SS program is the retirement earnings-test. In fact, in Italy workers
can draw a pension and earn income at the same time. However, there are earnings-cutoffs which
make this choice less attractive. The earnings cut-offs have changed over time and have been heavily
affected by the Reforms: I focus attention solely on the rules applying to private sector employees
prior to 1992: old-age SS benefits could be claimed while receiving earnings only if earnings did not
exceed the minimum benefits. Early retirement benefits could not be claimed along with earnings.
14From this brief description of eligibility criteria there emerges a SS System which is
actuariallyunfair and enacts, willingly or unwillingly, redistributionof resources across the
population.In particular, there is an incentiveto early retirement as no actuarial penalty applies to
earlyretireesFor example, a private sector employee who started work at age 16 could retire at age
SI whilethesame worker could retire at age 36 inthepublicsector.This might explain why
detachment fromthe labor force increases significantly over time in the age group 50-60 as well
(Figure l)
Benefit('omputation
Fora private sector employee (INPS-FPLD) benefits are computed by first averaging the last
five years' earnings (prior to the retirement age): this gives the level of "pensionable earnings"
Actual earntngs of each year are taken before tax and converted to real amounts by means of a
consumer price Pensionable earnings are converted to SS benefit by applying a 2% factor
(referred to as "rate of return") for each year of SS tax payment up to a maximum of4O years Hence
a worker can get at most 80% of his pensionable earnings. If retirement is postponed, additional
years of work beyond a total of 40 do not count for benefit computation; however, they are included
in pensionable earnings as they replace earnings of earlier years. The system is highly progressivc
both because of capping on earnings and because of old-age minimum benefit levels. Earnings
entering the benefit computation are capped. Between 1969 and 1988 pensionable earnings would be
set against a given limit and the amount in excess of that limit would not contribute to the benefit
formulaS Eg in 1985, pensionable earnings in excess of32 million Lit (1.6 times average earnings of
that year) would not be included in benefit calculations, After 1988 the constraint was less stringent,
as a lower "rate of return" was applied to pensionable earnings in excess of a given limit. In 1995 a
2% rate applied to the first 57 million Lit. (again 1.6 times average earnings), a 1.5% rate to
pensionable earnings in excess of that figure but below 76 million Lit. (2.2 times mean earnings), and
15the returnsfellto1.25%for pensionable earnings between 76 and 95 million Lit. (2.7 mean
earnings). Finally, the top earnings bracket attracted a 1% return.
The system is much more generous to low-income workers by providing a minimum benefit ,i.e.a
"floor" benefit level.
It is worth recalling that public-sector employees have their benefit level based on final salary rather
than average earnings of the last five years. For all fi.mds, benefits increase at regular intervals with
nominal wages, i.e. consumer price growth plus real earnings growth. The former is measured by the
consumer price index, but is implemented in a slightly staggered fashion (e.g. if the SS benefit
amounts to more than three times the "minimum benefit", indexing is based on 75% of the price
change.) Wage growth is measured by changes in real wages both in the private sector and public
sector29.
A'.finftnum benefit
This is a relevant concept in the Italian SS system both because the number of retirees involved is
non negligible, and because the minimum benefit is often used as a benchmark against which to set
incomes for other provisions. In practice, if the benefit formula gives a retiree a benefit level below a
given threshold the benefit itself is set in Line with that threshold. Up to 1983 this provision could be
applied to more than one pension for the same retiree, while it now affects only one pension for each
retiree, leaving the other benefits at their computed level, This income transfer to low income retirees
is conditional on means-testing: up to 1992 this test would involve only the claimants income and
exclude the income of the spouse. Hence, for example, in 1985 the means-test had a cutoff at twice
the minimum level (roughly 4.7 million Lit., of that year, which was 17% of mean household income
of the same year). More recently, a similar limit applies to singles, but for married couples what
16matters is the sum of incomes of both spouses, which has to be below 4 times the minimum level (in
1995approximately 8 millionLit, which was 18% of mean household income).
Taxation
While SS taxesare not subject to income taxes (as these are paid after the 55 tax), 55
benefits are taxed at current tax rates.
SurvivorBeize fits
Whilesurvivor benefits to widows were part of the insurance contract at a very early stage, it
was only in 1977 that several household members were entitled to claim such benefits: eligibility
extending from widows and children below 18 to include widowers and children older than 18 rn
full-time education. More recently beneficiaries include: (i) the surviving spouse, (ii) children
younger than 21 if in secondary school and younger than 26 if attending college for a degree or of
any age if disabled, (iii) conditional on none of the above being alive, dependent parents or single
dependent sisters and brothers can claim the benefit. In order to claim survivor benefit the worker
should have had a frill I 5 years' tax payments. Survivor benefits can also originate from the Dl
benefit of the worker (described below): in this case only 5 years of SS tax payments are required.
The actual benefit is a percentage of the old-age benefit that the deceased worker would receive at
that age. This is 60% for lone surviving spouse, 20% to each child, if one of the spouses is alive, and
40% if orphan, up to a total amount not exceeding the initial old age benefit of the worker Parents,
brothers and sisters receive, if eligible, 15% of the old-age benefit each, up to grand total of 100% of
the old-age benefit itself The Italian SS system does not envisage a dependent wife benefit: the only
advantages to married couples are for those drawing minimum level pensions (described above)
17Other SS Programs
Inrecent years the SS program has been under scrutiny as the financial distress within the
system led to calls for a reduction both in benefits levels and eligibility. This also focused the
attention of policy makers on a global SS reform in order to achieve a much needed realignment of
treatment of different groups of workers. This process started with two important changes brought
about in ] 984 and in I 989 the former relating to Dl provision and the latter trying to regulate those
benefits aimed at the redistribution of income. One of the key elements in the debate which took
place at the time was the insistence on clearly distinguishing between benefits relating to an income
maintenance program (implementing redistributive policies, which would therefore be financed by the
entire population) and benefits (which were more closely related to old-age insurance and therefore
more properly financed by the working population).
A typical income maintenance provision, in which the role of Central Government predominated over
that of the SS Administration was the means-tested "basicpcncio,s" (pensione socrnle) grantedto
individuals over 65 (even if they had made no SS tax payments). To be eligible, a single person
should not have an income above the level of the basic pension itself (the basic pension in 1995 was
4.6 million Lit., 13% of mean earnings) while a couple should not have an income above 19 million
Lit. in 1995 (54% of mean earnings). The benefit is granted with no penalty in the absence of other
incomes and it is awarded only partially if some resources are available within the income cutoff.
Another interesting example is unemployment benefit, paid in the form of early retirement benefit
(pre-pensionamento),grantedto workers of firms in specific industries going through a recession
period. This benefit can be claimed by the worker five years earlier than the normal retirement age
and could be regarded as a form of "involuntary" early retirement. However, not only does this apply
to a limited number of occupational sectors in the economy but it is also becoming less frequent.
18Disability Insurance
The most striking feature in this debate is the role of Disability Insurance, which is still part of
the SS Program. There are at present two possible DI benefits: (i) 'DI Pension, provided under the
legislation which applied up to 1984 and (ii) "DI Provision' (Assegno di /nvaled,tà) which can be
claimed under the post-1984 legislation. The former was granted to workers who proved they were
physically unable to carry out their job (with their earnings ability reduced by 2/3) and who had
completed 5 years' tax payments. Earnings ability was, however, a rather loose concept involving the
doctor's judgment of the general welfare level of the claimant, and not just his/her health quality. Dl
Pensions were computed by following the general rules of eligibility and of benefit calculation and by
computing pensionable earnings as the average of actual earnings prior to date of the claim. After
1984 the existing Dl Pensions were not terminated or modified, with the only exception for cases in
which the beneficiary had an income exceeding three times the minimum benefit. Starting in 1984,
the "Dl provision" was the new form of disability insurance benefit it was granted under the same
eligibility requirements as before, with the important difference that "loss of earnings ability" became
a much tighter requirement. Furthermore, the DI provision was temporary and a new claim was
required for renewal every three years, which entailed new medical examinations. Screening of health
status is now carried out randomly on DI recipients. The Dl provision is to be brought in line with
the minimum benefit whenever the calculated benefit is below that level.
This brief description of the DI benefit and its evolution over time highlights the strong
incentive provided to claim disability insurance in order to achieve early retirement in those cases
where the early retirement option was not available. However, the 1984 Law had a major impact in
reversing this trend: Figure 5 shows that the share of Dl benefits over total benefits peaked in the
years 1975-1980 and declined sharply thereafter. In Figure 6 the same pattern emerges from the ratio
of Dl benefits to insured workers: by relating Dl benefits to the working population (insured with
19[NPS-FPLD) it is possible to appreciate how the steepest decline came in 1987, when the new Dl
legislation of 1984 had its ff11 impact30. More interestingly, the age group for which Dl benefits over
total benefits dropped dramatically was the age group 50-59, which is the age group immediately
preceeding normal retirement age (Figure 7).
i/ic Severance Pay Fund -TblR.
This provision applies both to private sector and public sector employees. In the private sector, a
non-negligible fraction of annual earnings (7.41%) are ear-marked by employers towards an end-of-
job one-off payment. This money does not contribute to any pension fund but is directly managed
by the firm which uses it as internal fUnds. This appears as another key feature of the system in
analyzing the incentives of S.S. with regard to retirement, the prospect of cashing in a lump sum
at retirement (which would otherwise earn a low rate of interest) may induce a worker to leave the
labor force earlier than the normal retirement age.
The TFR was originally set up in the private sector and was regarded by workers as a form of
unemployment benefit, while firms encouraged the growth of this fUnd in order to both reduce
workers' mobility and create an extra source of internal financing. The legislation concerning the
lump sum benefit computation differs from sector to sector and, prior to 1982, from occupation to
occupation within the private sector. In particular, prior to 1982 the lump sum would, for the vast
majority of private sector employees, correspond to a share of 8.33% (i.e. 1/12) of final wage
adjusted according to the number of years in employment with the same firm. Hence the fUnd would
effectively grow at the wage-growth rate for each year up to 1982 and the employer would each year
retain 8,33% of the gross wage of his employees. After 1982, for all employees in the private sector
the fUnd built up each year was capitalized at a rate given by the sum of two components: a fixed
201 .5% plus 75% of the growth in prices recorded in the month of December of the previous year. In
periods of high inflation this growth rate would be below the price growth rate and much below
nominal wage growth. For this reason, it is often argued that workers would be better off if they
could invest that money with a financial institution. While 7.41% of gross earnings is retained by the
employer for the TFR fund in the way decribed above, a further 0.8%ofthe worker's gross earnings
is paidby the employer tothe INPS Administration, which does not contribute to the employee's 55
benefit nor to his TFR'. The employer collects a full rebate on this additional payroll tax by reducing
the TFR of his employees for an equivalent amount at the end of the year. Hence this additional tax
is effectively paid by the employee with no corresponding benefit.
While the TFR payroll tax is not subject to any income tax, the worker pays on the TFR lump sum
benefit separate income tax. I.e. the TFR lump sum received at retirement is not summed with other
incomes but is itself subject to income tax at the current tax rates32.
OldAge InsuranceThrough Private Schemes.
Saving through Pension Funds is available for only a limited number of individuals in specific
occupational sectors and is almost invariably a voluntary additional supplement to the basic
pension. More recently, the need to alleviate part of the burden of pension provision that falls on
Social Security has shifted attention to a system in which, in addition to the public pension scheme,
there should exist a non-own-managed Pension Fund and possibly a private old-age insurance
contract. The recent reforms intend to channel the enforced "low-return" savings of the TFR into
Pension Funds for newly-hired employees, provided the firm/industry and the Fund itself abide by a
number of requirements. It is still debated whether this change will increase or decrease workers'
welfare, depending on a number of factors (including the behavior of firms in setting wages).
21window of pensionable ages with actuarially-based adjustment of pensions. These vary between age
57 and 65 with "actuarial adjustment factors" between 4.720% and 5.136% respectively.
Contribution requirements changed from theinitial ISyears, to just 5 years after 1995. Payroll
taxes jumped to 32.7% of gross earnings (to be split between employer and employee): the increase
(from approximately 27% in 1 995) was partly artificial as it was simply the result of relabeling under
one SS tax rate several contribution items. The other provisions were basically unchanged, though
following the new eligibility requirements and benefit formula, the rules governing "minimum
benefits" became tighter. The Basic Pension (Pensione Sociale) was replaced by a Basic Provision
(Assegno Sociale) which was to be financed by the Central Government and was granted under
stricter means-testing.
Table A2 summarizes some of the key features of three regimes: the regime prevailing before
the Amato-Reform (denoted as pre-1992 Regime), the one prevailing at the steady state after the
Amato-Reform (post-1992 Regime) and the one prevailing after the Dini-Reform (post-1995-
Regime). However both reforms are characterized by a rather long transitional period affecting all
the cohorts of post-1992-retirees: the provisions for the transitional periods involve apro ia/a
method of establishing eligibility and benefit computation criteria. This method allows the legislation
of the old regime to apply to the share of years in employment under that regime, while the
remaining share is regulated by the new rules, This meant that in practice during the transitional
phase a retiree could have his eligibility and his 55 benefits computed according to three different
systems of legislation34.
Thehazard rate out of the labor force
23From the brief descriptionof the SS Systemin place before 1993 itisclear there were many "holes in
thenet", which allowed workersto get away earlier than the normal retirement age. The early
retirement option, which attractednoactuarialpenalty, wasthe leading candidate in explaining some
of the facts observed at the aggregate level. Other SS provisions have played a major role e.g. Dl
benefits mayhavecontributed to increasing detachment of young workers from the labor force, due
to the poor screening methods implemented prior to 1984. However, a more detailed description of
the dynamic nature of the retirement choice could be gained by looking at hazard rates. These are
costructed by using the panel dimension of the Bank of Italy data over three years of interviews
1989-1991-1993. Although the panel component is a rather small random sample (about 3000
households, roughly 8000 earner units per year) it is useful in controlling for compositional effects
(see Appendix I for a description of the data).
The hazard rate out of the labor force for men is depicted in Figure 18. There are several
interesting spikes in this diagram: at age 60 at age 55 and age 66. The first peak is easily
explained by recalling that the normal retirement age prevailing before 1992 in the private sector is
60 for men. The spike occurring at age 55 is, however, of almost comparable size: this corresponds
to recipients of either early retirement provisions or DI benefits. The huge spike at age 66 is partly
due to a small denominator and partly to the fact that private sector employees are only a fraction
of the labor force35. From Figure 19 it is possible to gauge the different labor force attachment of
women: the early spike at age 53-55 corresponds to normal retirement age in the private sector. By
65, virtually all women in the sample are out of the labor force. However, a non-negligible fraction
gradually exits the labor force by the age of 55.
In order to get a sharper description of the relationship between institutional features and actual
behavior I have computed hazards for the two sub-samples of private sector and public sector
employees. The limited sample size did not allow me to distinguish between males and females.
There is a clear distinction between the behavior of the two groups: in Figure ISa the hazard for
24private sector employees shows that there is a progressive detachment from the labor force at three
crucial ages: age 55 (presumably early retirement), age 60 (normal retirement age) and age 63.
Public sector employees (Figure 18b) also show an early peak at age 5S however many seem to
carry on working until normal retirement age (65).
These findings are confirmed by the frequency distribution of actual retirement ages presented in
Figures 20, 21 and 22. The pictures are based on actual retirement ages of retirees who answer a
retrospective question on which was the year of their retirement. I use four cross sections of the
Bank of Italy Survey (see Appendix I) for the years 1989,1991,1993 and 1995 and compute the
frequency distribution of the various retirement ages relative to the total number of retirees. These
figures show that institutional features greatly affected retirement decisions: two peaks occur for
men at ages 60 and 65; while for women there are three peaks at ages 55, 60 and 65.
Part III: Retirement Incentives
SimulationModel
Thesimulation model I use to assess the incentives of SS on retirement computes net SS
wealth for a married individual who was born in January 1930 and turned 65 in January 1995. The
simulation is carried out for a "base case" and for a number of alternative cases in which the
sensitivity of the results to the parameter configuration is assessed. Retirement is analyzed between
ages 55 and 69 and it is assumed that our median worker claims benefits under the pre-1992
legislation36. In fact, two major reforms of the Italian SS system took place within this period,
one in 1992 and one in 1995, both characterized by a long transitional period, as described in Part II.
On the one hand, the pre-1992 legislation seems the relevant regime on which to base the model in
order to explain the features of the time series data on labor force attachment; on the other hand,
25from 1993 onwards, individuals have experienced a gradual move toward a different system which is
not described in thesimulation.However, since the transitional phase, starting in 1993, has been
characterized by a prorala methodof benefit computation, which only marginally affected
individuals on the verge of retirement, the use of the pre-1992 legislation seems the appropriate
one7.
The simulation computes retirement old-age benefits, benefits to survivor (wife) if the worker has
died, and net pension wealth for a married employee in the private sector (i.e. insured with the INPS-
FPLD). It should be stressed that, as shown in Part II, the private sector employees fund INPS-
FPLD is representative of the insured population both in terms of size and because of its historical
relevance however, the other Funds (particularly the Government Employees and INPS-SeIf-
employed funds) are of non-negligible size and of growing importance. I neglect DI benefits since
the worker becomes eligible to claim benefits in 1985, when the new screening rules were in place
and Dl benefits could no longer be a substitute for early retirement, as was the case prior to I 984 1
take into account the "severance pay ftjnd" provision (TFR).
The basic assumption is that this individual worked continuously in a full-time job dunng his active
life. In almost all cases, the worker is assumed to enter the labor force at age 20. but in one case an
incomplete earnings history is modelled.
It should be said immediately that Italy has experienced wild variations in wage growth and price
growth rates over the past decades: it seemed reasonable to assume a constant earnings growth rate,
constant inflation rate and tax brackets fixed in real terms throughout the simulation. I present only
one case at the end of this section where I have adopted the actual earnings profile and actual tax
brackets as a counterfactual. All these assumptions will be described in more detail below.
The simulation involves a number of steps:
26(a) Computation of the benefit level a/the chosen retirement age.
This step requires computing a sort of "final salary" formula, which is obtained by averaging the last
five years' gross earnings (inflation-indexed) -thisaverage is referred to as pensionable earnings.
The retiree will receive in his first year of retirement 2% on pensionable earnings, for each year of
contributions, up to a maximum of 40 years contribution. Cappings apply to the computation of
pensionable earnings, and benefit levels which do not reach a given minimum threshold are brought
up to that level (see Part 11 and Appendix I for details). Net benefits are obtained by subtracting the
income tax applying in that given year.
('bY) Computation of expected Social Security Wealth.
Net Social Security Wealth is the present discounted value of future benefits up to age 100. This is
the weighted sum of projected benefits with weights given by male survival probability, and the
individual discount rate. The pre-1992 legislation applies a "double-indexation" of benefits which
grow both with inflation and real wages38. I compute a stream of future benefits in nominal terms.
This allows me to set the nominal benefits against the actual level of the mimimum benefit in each
year when considering the incentives for a low-earnings individual. In fact, although everything else
grows with the economy, I use actual parameters as far as the 55 features are concerned. In
particular, the historical levels for capping of earnings, for the minimum benefit levels and for the 55
tax rate are adopted. This also makes it easier to compute after-income-tax benefits on the basis of
the nominal benefit. In fact, income taxes apply to pension income as well as to earnings:'9. Hence,
all figures are then discounted back to age 55 at a nominal rate based on a 3% real discount rate plus
a 3.5% inflation rate. The mortality prospect is given by the Italian sex/age specific life tables40. The
life table is kept unchanged over the years, i.e. the perspective is taken of a 55-year-old-forward
looking worker who plans for his retirement at each future age up to 69. To compute net SSW 1
27take out, along with income taxes, SS payroll tax that the individual would pay during any continued
work. Hence, if the worker evaluates the possibility of postponing retirement for one year, his SSW
is net of the present value (at age 55) of SS payroll tax that he and his employer would pay in that
year41. Because income tax rates and SS tax rates (plus the severance pay fUnd tax rates) affect
earnings and SSW calculation in a complex fashion, I provide below a sketch of the steps taken in
the simulation to include these different tax rates.
'c)Pension Wealth Iv the surviving wife.
The Italian 55 System provides a pension to survivors ( in this simulation, the surviving wife),
though no benefit is provided to the dependent wife42. Hence a joint likelihood of death of the
worker and survival of the wife is computed for each year beyond the chosen retirement age In the
base case the worker's wife is three years younger and has never worked.
(ci)Severwwe PayP',,ndBenefit (IFR,).
Thisinvolves computing the lump sum benefit at the age of retirement corresponding to the 7.41%
fraction of gross earnings ear-marked by the employer for this hind. While the lump sum benefit is
added to SSW, the TFR-tax from additional work reduces net 55W. 1 have made two simp1if'ing
assumptions throughout all the simulations in order to compute the TFR.
(I) The relevant rules for benefit computation are those in place after 1982 (see Part II). This implies
that the same rate is used to capitalize the TFR hind each year (1.5% plus 75% of the inflation rate),
hence underestimating the value of the Fund accumulated up to 1982, In fact, up to 1982, the hind
would basically grow at the nominal growth rate of the worker's wage43.
(2) I do not apply income tax to the TFR benefit: this omission overestimates the actual benefit.
Since the average income-tax rate on the TFR benefit is approximately, for a median worker,
28between 10% and 15%, this should be almost equivalent to the underestimation discussed above
Hence the two biases should roughly cancel each other out44.
Methodological issues
Theresultsof the simulation are the net of tax replacement rate, the accrual rate and the
tax/subsidy rate from additional work. The netof taxreplacementrateis the rate at which the net
SS benefit replaces the worker's (after tax) earnings should he continue to work in that year. The
other two measures of the incentives provided by the SS Program require the computation of net
SSW. This is the present value of ftiture pension benefits (after income tax) net of the present value
of any additional contribution from continued work. Hence the accrual ratecanbe computed as the
percentage change in net SSW from the previous year. Finally, the implicittax/subsidy isthe
absolute change in net SSW over the potential earnings from working an additional year. The implicit
tax/subsidy should be interpreted as an implicit tax, via SS entitlements, on an additional year of
work. The numerator is the opposite of the numerator used in the accrual rate and it measures the
change in SSW looking at one additional year of work. hence a positive number indicates a
disincentive to (a tax on) work through SSW which the worker foregoes.
Both the net replacement rate and the implicit tax/subsidy require a measure of earnings from
additional work: since the income tax system and the SS tax system interact in a complex way it is
best to provide some notation at this stage.
Replacement Rate
Both the SS benefit and the earnings of the additional year of work are subject to income taxes. In
accordance with the Italian tax system the relevant measure of earnings is obtained by first
subtracting SS taxes and then income taxes, as SS contributions are not subject to income tax. A
fbrther complication arises when considering the TFR-tax45, This is a fraction of gross earnings
29retained by the employer which is not recorded in the available gross earnings data (neither is the
employer SS tax). Hence, under the assumption that the employer SS tax payment and the TFR tax
are reflected in a lower wage, a grossing-up procedure is required in order to obtain the theoretical
gross earnings figure.
Let' assume that the tax system can be described by one tax rate r1 (in fact, there are several tax
rates, tax exemptions and tax rebates). Let r,bethe worker SS tax rate, TE be the employer SS
tax rate and VTFR be the TFR tax rate, while Y represents earnings before income tax and employee
SS tax but after the TFR tax and after SS taxes have been paid by the employer46. Hence Y
represents earnings as recorded by the available survey data.
Thereplacementrate is based on after-income-tax and after-SS-tax earnings on the one hand, and
after-income-tax SS benefits on the other hand; hence, obviously, the lump sum TFR benefit (a




Inmeasuring earnings which appear in the denominator of the implicit taxlsubsidy I add back to
after-income-tax earnings both the employee and the employer contributions. In fact, these have
already been taken out of net SSW. In other words, earnings (YTS) which appear in the denominator
of the implicit taxlsubsidy are obtained by grossing up as follows:
YTS=YN± vY+TEY+ VTFRY
30Assumptions for the "base case'
Inthe "base case" simulation the worker is characterized by a "synthetic earnings history". This is
obtained by projecting backward and forward the 1994 median earnings of a particular year-of-birth
cohort of workers. Median earnings are computed on a panel of workers (private sector employees)
in continuous employment, drawn from the Private Sector SS workers archive. The data available
goes from 1974 to 199448. Although it would seem appropriate to focus on the cohort which was
born in exactly 1930, 1 have defined a cohort of a 10-year age band (from 1927 to 1936): this is in
order to allow for both a reasonable sample size within each cell and comparability with other data
sets49.
Because wages for all cohorts, and particularly for the cohort we are interested in. show marked
changes over the sample period (mainly due to price changes) and since income taxes greatly affect
net earnings in a non linear fashion over the years, the simulation results based on historical earning
profiles and historical tax rates proved hard to interpret. It seemed approriate to turn to an economy
where wages and taxes grow at constant rates. Hence I used the 1994 median earnings figure and the
1994 tax system as a starting point.To project earnings both forward and backward I used the
assumptions on inflation, wages and GDP growth adopted by the Italian Government in making their
forecasts on future SS Government expenditure50. The choice of a cohort of MI-time employees in
continuous employment provides a misleading estimate of median earnings of that cohort: part-time
work and, more importantly, incomplete earnings histories, are quite common in the Italian labor
market. However, this characterization of the base case is then compared with an alternative case
where an incomplete earnings history is modelled explicitly. Finally, I adopt the historical values for
31SS tax rateswhilethe TFR retention rate is assumed constant throughout, for the reasons given
above
Base Case Results
Table I shows the base case results. Each row represents the age of the worker in the last year that
he works. Hence the first row presents results for a married man who has worked during the year
1984 and retired on his 55th birthday (January 1, 1985). The first column is the net replacement rate
described above. The row which is highlighted refers to the first year of eligibility. The next three
columns show the evolution of net SSW over time. Finally, marginal retirement incentives are
captured by the rates presented in the last two columns, It is worth recalling at this stage the aspects
of the SS system which determine the figures in Table 1, in particular the tax implicit in postponing
retirement by one year.
(a) The pre-1992 regime allowed a private sector employee to benefit from early retirement, with no
age requirement, provided 35 years contributions had been completed. Hence, although the normal
retirement age for a man in the private sector was 60, the base-case individual could actually claim
retirement as early as his 55th birthday. Also it should be noted that, although retirement is non-
mandatory, in practice very few can retire after age 65 (see Part II on this point)
(b) For each additional year of work, the worker must pay SS taxes: in Italy these have grown in
discrete jumps. Hence net SSW is affected in a non-linear fashion over time.
(c) The additional year of earnings enters the benefit computation formula, both because pensionable
earnings are an average taken over the last five years' earnings, and because, up to age 60 any such
additional year increases the fraction of years of contributions accounted for in the computation
rtself. After age 60 the fraction of pensionable earnings which is converted into a pension stays
constant at 80%. The effect on SSW of adding one year to the benefit computation then depends on
32real earnings growth and inflation, in fact, past earnings are converted to current figures by means of
price indexation.
(d) For an additional year of work there are fewer years over which benefits are claimed, lowering
SSW. On the other hand, the TFR fund accumulates for one more year; but the rate of return on this
Rinds is below nominal earnings growth and has no actuarial adjustment.
(e) For each fl.tture year there is a chance that the worker will die, lowering his SSW.
The first result to notice in Table I is that the replacement ratios are very high at all ages. This is an
important feature of the Italian system to be kept in mind in order to explain all subsequent results.
Although the benefit computation formula suggests that SS benefit should replace at most 80% of
pensionable earnings, the actual figures show replacement ratios which range from 0.735 to 0.803.
This is both because pensionable earnings differ from earnings coming from an additional year of
work and because the tax system affects both the numerator and the denominator in a progressive
fashion. The variation over time of the replacement ratio is totally explained by the SS tax figures:
the same rate computed before SS tax earnings would give simply two levels, one before age 60 and
one after age 60.
Table 1 shows that a typical worker starts with a net pension wealth SSW (inclusive of the TFR
benefit) of 285 million Lit. reaching 183 million Lit, at age 65 (going from approximately IS times to
7 times his respective median earnings). There is a steady decline in SSW over the life cycle,
however, a careful inspection of accrual rates reveals a significant fall between age 59 and age 60.
This means that there is no incentive to delay retirement -particularlyat the normal retirement age -
(becausein that year the individual completes 40 years' tax payments and reaches "Rill contribution
history").
The final column shows the taxlsubsidy rate. This is a very high number: the tax on working one
additional year is roughly between 25% and 82% of after-income-tax earnings of that year. The main
33reason for such a remarkable result is the large replacement ratio implied by the pre-1992 SS
system. Similarly to the accrual rate, the implicit tax shows a jump at age 60 and it then grows
steadily for later ages (a graph is provided in Figure 23).
Finally, it should be noted that while the Severance Pay Fund Provision (TFR) affects the levels of
SSW, it does not have significant effects on the marginal changes in SSW or on the shape of the
implicit tax/subsidy profile52. Further simulations (not shown here) imply that the implicit tax is
higher in the presence of the TFR provision than in its absence, providing one more reason to retire
early. This is because the return on this fund is lower than earnings growth.
Othercases
inthis section some sensitivity analysis is carried out by allowing for both permutations in the age-
earnings profile and variations in the parameters.
Table 2 looks at a single man who considers retirement at different future ages, starting at age 55
The results for the replacement rate differ only slightly from the base case scenario. In fact, under the
assumption that the wife never worked, old-age-pension benefits for a couple are based on the man's
earnings profile However, the income tax system differs in the two cases and it entails a tax rebate
for couples which could affect both SS benefits and earnings. The replacement rate is lower than for
a married man (apart from the first figure at age 55), hence suggesting that the income tax rebate
weighs more on the earnings of an additional year of work than on SS benefits. SSW is at a lower
level than for a married man because there is no pension to the surviving spouse. Results for the
accrual rate are simply a re-scaled version of the finding obtained for a married man at a slightly
lower level (hence becoming more negative). The implicit tax is lower throughout for a single man
(apart from the first figure) than for the married man, again because of the income tax system A
slight divergence between the implicit tax path for a couple and for a single worker occurs toward
the end of the working life, due to the effect of the wife's survival probability becoming important in
34the net SSW calculation. This similarity across the two cases is explained by: (a) the lack of
additional benefit for the dependent wife; (b) benefits to the surviving spouse are provided with no
age Emit (only means-testing).
Table 3describesthe results for a worker with an incomplete earnings history. Unlike the base
case, he starts working at age 24 (in i954); hence when considering retirement on his 55th birthday
he would have completed only 31 years out of4O of his SS tax history and would reach frill eligibility
only at age 64 (workingat age 63).This variation on the base case has interesting implications for
the incentive results. First, the replacement rate is lower than in the base case up to age 64 and it
then coincides. The tax/subsidy path is shifted to the right at a much lower level for ages below 65.
This is because at that point frill eligibility is reached in both cases, hence up to that age there is a
higher incentive to work for someone who entered the labor force later. After age 65 the two paths
do not overlap exactly because of the TFR provision, which stays constantly lower for the case of an
incomplete earnings history.
Further variations to the base case are obtained by changing the age-earnings profile and the
institutional set up.The results are summarized in Table 5, where findings across different
simulations are shown for significant ages only, and in two graphs where the time series evolution of
the tax/subsidy rate is considered.
The first permutation is in the earnings profile by including both ends of the distribution of earnings.
In the Italian SS system there is both capping on pensionable earnings and topping up of low benefit
levels, hence interesting cases may be explored when earnings reach the roof or the floor of SS
benefits. Experimenting with the data revealed that the two interesting cases lie at the top 95% and
bottom 5% of the distribution of earnings53. These two points of the distribution were obtained, for
the year 1994, from the same panel data set used in constructing median earnings. In both cases, Ithen applied the same earnings growth rate (backward and forward) used for the median earnings
profile. For the earnings capping level and the "minimum benefit" I take actual figures; however, for
the years after 1995, they are calculated on the basis of economic growth.
These permutations show some inherent redistributional features of the Italian 55 system and they
explain how these provide incentives for intertemporal decisions by individuals. Obviously
replacement rates are on average much higher for the 5th percentile and much lower for the 95th
percentile than in the base case: an example for age 61 can be found in the first column of Table 5.
Accrual rates and the tax/benefit of continued work look very different in the base case than they do
for the low-earner and high-earner individual. Some interesting insights can be gained from the
comparison. In fact, while capping on pensionable earnings applies to pensionable earnings, topping
up of benefits applies directly to the benefit level. The tax/subsidy pattern for the bottom 5% of the
distribution shows large fluctuations (Figure 23). This is because the minimum benefit grows roughly
in line with actual historical earnings. The implicit tax levels are very high (reaching a peak of 180%
of potential earnings at age 62). In fact, there is a large transfer component from the system to the
individual which the individual foregoes if he postpones retirement. Opposite results are obtained for
the top 95thpercentile. Thereplacement rate is lower than for the base case and the implicit tax
pattern is constantly lower than the base case. This is explained by a high level of potential earnings
(in the denominator) which is not flilly reflected in the benefit computation (in the numerator).
Moreover, the 95th-percentile tax pattern is not as smooth as the age-tax profile obtained for the
base case, again because actual earnings capping changes over time in discrete jumps.
A further set of results is based on the post-1995 legislation. The assumption is made that the 1995
reform of the Italian SS system has been completely phased in -andthis naturally means that one
should be extremely careful in interpreting the findings. In fact, as explained in Part II, the
36transitional period of the 1995 Reform is a very long one (ending 2035),whilein my simulation the
legislation is considered when implemented for a worker retiring between the years 1985 and 2000.
At this stage, it is useful to give a brief recap of a few crucial features of the post-1995 (steady state)
legislation, as they differ radically from those of the base case scenario.
(a) The post-1995 reform adopts an average-earnings based method of benefit calculation. First the
present value (at retirement) of past payroll taxes is determined, This is obtained by taking a 33%
shareof past earnings for each year in which the worker and the employer paid payroll taxes and
weighing each past wage by means of a 5-year-moving-average of the nominal GDP-growth-rate
This stock measure is then converted into an annuity by applying an age-related actuarial adjustment
factor given below.
(b) The 1995-Reform enacts a window of pensionable ages with an actuarially-based adjustment of
pensions: the ages are between 57 and 65 with factors ranging between 4.72% and 6.135%
respectively. Before age 57 I have used a constant factor 4.72% and after age 65 a constant factor
6.136%.
(c) Future benefits then grow with prices only.
(d) The TFR provision abides by the same rules as in the old Regime.
It is obvious that the crucial features of this benefit calculation method are: (I) the difference
between the (smoothed) GDP growth rate and the earnings growth experienced by each individual
and (2) the actuarial adjustment factor. Because individuals cannot withdraw from the labor force
before their 57th birthday or after their 65th birthday I have highlighted these two rows, however, as
with the base case, I have carried out the simulation from age 54 (last year of work) to age 69
From Table 4 there immediately emerges a striking contrast with the pre-1992 regime with regard to
the replacement rate figures (now ranging between 0.463 and 0.652) and the net SSW figure
37(roughly million Lit. 160 at age 54, i.e. 10 times median earnings). This is because workers only
gradually build up an increasing stock of SS taxes. Accrual rates are negative throughout however,
they do not follow the pattern observed for the base case. Perhaps the most interesting comparison
with the base case is that concerning the implicit tax (Figure 25). While the implicit tax is much
lower than in the base case, the new Regime does not particularly encourage work beyond age 57
(age of eligibility). Between age 64 and age 65 the implicit tax jumps because there is no fUrther
increase in the adjustment factor. After age 65 the implicit tax grows almost in line with that in the
base case. this is because in both cases all the relevant parameters remain constant. However, while
in the pre-1992 Regime benefits grow with earnings (with no Rind build-up), in the new Regime
benefits grow with prices but the stock of SS taxes builds up. The behavior of the implicit tax
between ages 57 and 65 is not as smooth as one would expect, given the emphasis placed by the
Reform on producing an "actuarially fair system" and given that the simulation is based on constant
growth rates. This may be explained by the calibration of the actuarial adjustment factor which is
based on slightly different life table from the one used in this study and by the use of a different
discount factor. In fact, the actuarial adjustments of the benefits which, under the new regime, apply
at the different retirement ages was calibrated by Government Actuaries in order to achieve actuarial
fairness across retirement ages for an individual who is 62 in 1996 and by assuming a real discount
rate of
Finally, it is interesting to compare the base case with a counterfactual case where the actual
earningsprofile and actual income taxes have been used to produce a "realistic case".
Earnings are computed by taking medians from the given year-of-birth cohort of employees by
calendar year. To follow this cohort back through time (i.e. before i 977) I used the growth rate of
gross earnings, at current prices, for employees in the industrial sector. The age-earnings profile of
the "typical actual worker" does not show an appreciable decline until the last available years: the
stable growth in earnings for this group is explained both by the fact that we are following a true
38cohort of frill-time male employees through time and by the fact that my definition of this cohort
covers a wide age band. This implies that part-time work should be excluded from the sample by
definitionand that sample numerosity only becomes a problem for the last few years, when many
members of the cohort have retired55. Hence it is only from age 60 (year 1990) that I have replaced
actual earnings with their projection, obtained by letting earnings increase at the same growth rate as
nominal wages in the industrial sector. For this case, I provide information at age 61 (in Table 5) and
the implicit tax profile (Figure 26). It is clear that the results for the "actual earnings" profile are
totally dominated by changes in earnings growth rates and income taxes. The highest disincentive to
supply labor for an extra year is for those of age 57, 60 and 63; after age 67 there is a steady decline
in the implicit tax. While the peak at age 60 can again be explained by, amongst other things, full
eligibility, the spike at age 57 is partly due to a decline in the earnings growth rate immediately
followed by a sharp increase (the former affects the numerator while the latter affects the
denominator). This is also reflected in a relatively low replacement rate for age 57. This early spike is
a particularly interesting feature of the system as it happens to coincide almost exactly with a peak in
the male hazard rate out of labor force.
Partiv: Conclusions
The Italian SS System is characterized by strong incentives to early retirement. These have certainly
had an impact on individual intertemporal decisions, particularly those concerning labor supply. Both
time series data and micro data provide support for the view that there is a causality relation between
the increased generosity of the SS system and its eligibility criteria, and the timing of retirement.
Moreover, the simulation exercise carried out in this study shows that these incentives differ across
groups of the population according to such characteristics as individual earnings profiles and work
experience. The tax on additional work implied by foregone Social Security wealth is almost
39invariably large and it usually peaks at the ages when the empirical evidence shows the highest
detachment rates from the labor force. For example, the male hazard shown in Figure 18 and the
distribution of actual retirement ages (Figure 21) suggest that there are three typical ages for leaving
the labor force: a first peak is observed at ages 55 then a significant peak at age 60 (corresponding
to normal retirement age in the private sector) whilst the third exit from the labor force occurs
around age 65. This is in line with the incentives provided by the SS system as measured by the
implicit tax/subsidy. In fact, the tax/subsidy profile (Table 1) suggests that the system encourages
workers to leave the labor force at all ages, and certainly to retire no later than age 60. The existence
of these incentives in the SS Program is even more evident in the tax/subsidy profile computed under
"realistic assumptions" with regard to the earnings profile and the income tax system. (Figure 27).
This exercise points out that not only is the SS benefit formula actuarially unfair, but it is also totally
dominated by the behavior of wages and prices immediately before the year chosen to retire As a
result, the median worker of this exercise would find it very costly to postpone retirement after age
57 This suggests that a simple cost/benefit analysis calculation might have induced many to take
advantage of early retirement, which in Italy has been widely available with no acturial penalty. The
SS reforms of 1992 and 1995, aimed at reducing benefit outlays, have affected worker's behavior in
many respects There is a direct effect on savings, related to the susbtantial reduction in household
pension wealth due to reduced benefit levels and restricted eligibility criteria. While the effects on
labor supply decisions are harder to gauge, the econometric evidence presented in Appendix II
suggests that the 1992 reform was regarded by many as a breaking-point, after which the SS system
could no longer be as generous as in the past. Hence, many reacted to the reform by bringing
forward their expected retirement age (particularly young people in the private sector).
40Appendix 1: Data Sources
historicaldata:
(a)Labor force participation by age and sex, (Figures 1-2).
This is based on ISTAT Annuario del lavoro e deIl'emigrazione, (1958-1980), and Supplemento al
Rollettino Mensile, several issues, plus Rilevazione delle Forze di Lavoro, Collana di Informazione,
1986-1994. The jump in the series in 1976, also discussed in Casavola-Sestito (1994), was produced
by a change in the definition of both unemployment and employment. Afier that year, these two
terms covered people actively seeking for work even if not previously in employment and people
who did not regard themselves as employed but who worked during the survey week.
(h) Share of workers.
(I) ISTAT: Annuario del lavoro (several issues). ISTAT: Rilevazione delle Forze di Lavoro, in
Supplemento al Bollettino Mensile di Statistica (1975-1985) e Collana di Informazione (1986-1995).
(2) Ministero del Tesoro e della Programmazione Economica: Relazione sulla Situazione Economica
del Paese (several issues)
(3)For the insured population: INPS, Notizie Statistiche (several issues).
(c) Benefit Recipiency.
The figures based on historical data for benefit receipts are drawn from:
ISTAT, Statistiche dei trattamenti pensionistici in Co/lanadi InJorinazione (1985-1994)and
ISTAT, Supplemento al Bollettino Mensile di Statistica (1975-1984),
INPS, Notizie Statistiche, 1977-1980,
41However, some more details can be found in CENSIS-CER "Rapporto sulla Situazione Sociale del
Paese". The Treasury has published some special reports on projections for fluture pension outlays:
Ministero del Tesoro, Ragioneria General dello Stato: Tendenze Demografiche e Spesa Pensionistica
(1996) andSanitã,Scuo]a e Pensioni (1997).
('ontemporaneous data:
Allfigurestabulated by the author are drawn from the Bank of Italy Survey 1989-1993 (see below).
StudyingRedrement in Italy.
Thereare two main sources available at a micro level.
(I) Cross sectional Data provided by the Bank of Italy at regular intervals. This is a nation-wide
survey which collectsdetailedinformationonItalian households concerning their
saving/consumption decisions, earnings of each member of the family and demographic variables. I
have used several cross-sections of the Survey: the waves available since 1984 (i.e. 1984, 1985,
1986, 1987. 1989, 1991 and 1993); plus the waves that are part of the "Bank of Italy Historical
Archive" (annually from 1977 to 1983). The two sets of samples differ in many respects: the
former (ie.more recent waves) have a larger number of observations (around 8000 as opposed to
4000 or less for previous years), but there is less detailed information on working status (e.g. the
age at which the individual started working is missing) and, most importantly, age is recorded in
10 years/IS years bands which are kept fixed over the years. In this study I have used only the 1989-
1991-1993 surveys, however I have carried out comparisons with the other available source (2). To
this end, I constructed year-of-birth cohorts for both sources, which I kept fixed throughout the
study.
I assigned individuals to different year-of-birth cohorts on the basis of the information on their age
and the year of the survey. For all the observations where age was recorded in intervals (surveys
42of the years 1977-1983), 1 randomly assigned individuals to year-of-birth cohorts by assuming a
uniform distribution within the age interval. Each age band may contain up to three cohorts.
In order to cope with the scarcity of observations resulting for some cells and given the restriction
imposed by the recording of age before 1984, I defined cohorts over year-of-birth bands as in table
Al Besides the characteristics of those already retired, there are some retrospective questions posed
to both retirees and workers (e.g. age at which they started work). However, a full work history
cannot be constructed. There are also questions about expected retirement age and, in just one
survey, expected SS benefit.
(2) The Data Base of the INPS Administration-Archive OhM.
This is an unbalanced panel running for 20 years (1974-1994) which records information about
workers on the basis of a form sent yearly to the INPS Administration by employers. The
information available concerns age, sex, occupation, wage and changes ofjob characteristics, but no
information on education, or household structure is available. I constructed cohort gross earnings
profiles for the simulation on the basis of this sample according to the following bands.
TableA3: Cohorts Definition
yearof' birth
cohort I before 1911
cohort 2 between1912 and 1926
cohort 3 between 1927 and 1936
cohort 4 between 1937 and 1946
cohort 5 between 1947 and 1956
cohort 6 between 1957 and1959
cohort 7 between 199) and 1963
cohort 8 after1963
43Appendix IL: The Effects of SS on Retirement -
Surveyof the Literatureand Econometric Estimates.
Inthis section I intend to give a brief review of the literature on incentives within the 55 Program
affecting individuals behavior and then move on to some new empirical evidence which tries to
directly measure behavioral responses to changes in SS provisions.
Existing Literature
While a great deal of research has been carried out both on the effects of the Reforms and on the
relationship between saving behavior and SS wealth, very little attention has been devoted to the
effects of 55 security arrangements on labor supply. There are a few notable exceptions: in
particular, Geroldi (1993), Peracchi and Rossi (1996) and Padoa Schioppa Kostoris (1996). The
work carried out by Peracchi and Rossi tries to assess the overall impact of the 1995 Reform and
stresses, amongst other aspects, how there are some distinct patterns in the time series data clearly
generated by the increasing generosity of the SS system. In particular, the authors report some of the
evidence produced by Geroldi to note that labor force participation in Italy is lower than in other
countries and this is particularly so for the age group 5 5-59 (immediately prior to the normal
retirement age). The authors also point out that the existence of the early retirement option is a very
likely explanation of the fact that the average employment rate for the age group 50-57 falls with
44each year of age. Theresultspresented in this study (Part I and Part 111) confirm these facts. A more
direct question is raised by the work of Padoa Schioppa Kostoris (1996), who evaluates the potential
financial gains from the 1995-reform under different scenarios To this end, the author estimates
potential quits originating from early retirement by setting up a simulation model in which the gains
for a representative individual from postponing retirement are computed. The author shows that the
possibility of working while retired provides, under certain conditions, a large incentive to retire
early. Another relevant approach to assessing the importance of the labor supply incentives of SS
security is to turn attention away from the "median worker" to other cases. A very detailed study by
Rostagno (1996) shows that incomplete earnings histories may play a crucial role in evaluating the
effects of the reforms and that these cases may be much more common then previously thought. This
might help to explain some features of the hazard rates out of the labor force shown in this study
(Part II), because while many retire well before the normal retirement age there is still action in the
data after age 60.
An important test of the effects of changes in the institutional setting is the analysis of the
behavioral responses of individuals and households. There is a very stimulating empirical literature
on the effects of the SS system on the saving patterns of Italian households. After the early papers
which estimated a very low degree of substitutability between pension wealth and private wealth
(Brugiavini, 1991 and Jappelli, 1994) on households micro data, a number of contributions have
challenged that finding Rossi and Visco (1994 and i995) argue that much of the decline in the
Italian saving rate in the 1970's was due to the increased generosity of the SS system over those
years and time series estimates suggest that about one third of Italian accumulated capital stock may
have been lost because of this exceptional growth. More recently Attanasio and Brugiavini (I 995)
have adopted a "natural experiment" approach in using micro data to evaluate the differential impact
of the 1992-reform on the saving behavior of households. In particular, the authors distinguish
45between groups ofthepopulationwhich are likely to be affected in different ways by the reform and
thenlook at the mean variation (betweenthepost-reform and the pre-reform value) in savings across
these groups. It emerges that between 1991and 1993 groups which were most affected by the
reform intermsof benefit cuts or tightereligibilityrules also tended to save more.
Redistributional Effects of the SS System and Econometric Estimates of Changes in Expected
Retirement Age.
One distinct feature of the Italian 55 System is the difference existing in the arrangements of the
different finds, I have already discussed how the Public Sector, as opposed to Private Sector,
Employees Fund was privileged in many respects by the pre-1992 legislation, particularly because of
the early retirement option (more generous for the Public Sector) and because of the benefit
computation formula (of a pure final salary type in the Public Sector). Castellino (1994) estimates
that a large stock of resources were redistributed across generations and across finds because of
these different features. One way to look at how these differences affect labor supply decisions is to
contrast the hazard rate of Public Sector Employees and Private Sector employees as I have done in
Part 11 (Figures 1 8a and I 8b). In the private sector, three relevant peaks were pointed out: age 56
(early retirement) age 60 (normal retirement) and age 64 (possibly incomplete earnings history). In
the public sector there is also evidence of early retirement between ages 55 and 61, but then virtually
every worker has retired by age 65 (normal retirement age).
Turning to the econometric evidence I present some estimates of changes in expected retirement
ages drawn from the Bank of Italy panel of household level data. The methodology adopted is a
"difference-in-difference" estimator and draws heavily on the work by Attanasio and Brugiavini
46(1995) described above. In particular, the basic identif'ing assumption is that the 1992-reform is the
only relevant change (as far as differential labor supply decisions are concerned) and therefore I
exploit the reform to measure behavioral responses before and after the event. The first difference is
the time difference and the second difference is that between groups. Groups in the population are
assumed to be exogenously determined and, given the availability of panel data, I can control for
individual's characteristics throughout (Venti and Wise, 1995). Hence membership of a group can be
interpreted as an instrument (control). I allocate individuals to groups according to the
characteristics observed at the beginning of the sample (year 1989) and discard those who later
cross groups, particularly if they change employment status and type of occupation. A careful
selection of the sample is crucial to this methodology, because of the identification issues described
above. This left me with approximately 1500 men and 700 women.
Given that the panel is partly rotating -i.e.some households are replaced after two years -
thereare at least two data points for each individual, which allowed me to compute differences in the
expected retirement age. I selected six groups, three according to occupation: (i) employee in the
private sector (ii) employee in the public sector and (iii) other occupations; and two according to
experience: (1)less than 15 years' SS tax payments in 1993, (2) more than 15 years' tax payments in
1993. This is because the 1992 reform relies on a pro ralamethod(described earlier) which leaves
therulesto be adopted for the latter group almost unchanged, while it greatly affects the eligibility
criteria and benefit calculation for the former group. However, in constructing the variable
"experience" I had to rely on information regarding the age at which work started, which may be a
noisy measure. A slight different selection criteria based on year-of-birth cohorts provided almost
identical results in the estimates. It is worth recalling at this stage that the Amato reform of 1992 has
gradually postponed the normal retirement age but has not tackled the early retirement option, apart
from restricting eligibility requirements in the public sector56,
47Table 6 presents mean expected retirement age for some groups of the population. While the figures
are a suggestive of a reduction occurring between year 1991 and year 1993 it is hard to place any
statistical significance on this finding.
Tables 7 and 8 show the econometric estimates. In table 7 the regression is carried out for
males, the dependent variable is the change (in years) in expected retirement age, the explanatory
variables are group dummies which take value I if the individual belongs to that group and zero
otherwise In this case, OLS estimates automatically deliver an efficient estimator of mean changes in
thedependentvariable. In fact, variations in sample numerosity across groups suggest that it is
possible to improveonsimple arithmetic means.
The results of table 7 give the baseline specification. Expected retirement age seems to have
increased between 1989 and 1995, particularly for young individuals working in the private sector
However, the results of table 8 suggest that the reforms have had an impact on expected retirement
age: in 1993 young individuals working both in the private sector and in the public sector tended to
bring forward their expected retirement age. This is in line with the common belief that, while
postponing normal retirement age (in the private sector), the 1992-reform has mainly affected
younger workers. In particular, young workers in the private sector tended to bring forward
retirement by approximately 2,5 years and there is evidence of a significant difference in the behavior
of private sector and public sector employees.
Interpretationof results
Itis hard to provide a clearcut interpretation of the above results, particularly because the event
"retirement" may be quite far in the thture for many workers in the sample and the expected
48retirement age couldbe a noisy variable. The 1992 reform did not remove the early retirement
option, hence it would still be possible, both in the private sector and in the public sector, to bring
forward retirement, while the reform did postpone the statutory retirement age. Young workers
have been greatly affected by the 1992 reform as their SS wealth has been reduced by a considerable
amount The implicit tax profile, corresponding to the 1992 reform (see Fig.24), shows that the
implicit tax on work is still positive and high over the life cycle, hence providing an incentive to retire
early What seems to emerge (also from table 6) is that before the reform many thought of their
retirement age as the normal retirement age, while the reform has focused the attention of workers
on this issue. The 1992 reform also made it clear that the system could no longer be as generous in
the past, and, given the incentive system discussed in this paper, on average workers want to get out
of the program as soon as they can.
49FOoT NOTES
In1990 estimates were: (i) an average of t.3 children per woman of child bearing age and (ii) tife
expectancy at birth of 73.6 years for men and 80.2 for women. Source: Treasury Special Report (Ministero del Tesoro.
Ragioneria Generale detlo Stato). The Italian Central Statistical Office has more recently (1996) estimated: (i) an
average of 1.18 children per woman and a life expectancy at birth of 75.3 for men and 81.7 for women.
This ratio is given by old people to people of working age. The ratio based on the actual labor force figures
(appearing as the denominalor) may be misleading as labor force series show a jump in 1977 due to a change in the
Labor Force Survey questionnaire.
Source: M. Livi Bacci (1995) and ISTAT (1996). The difference between the series of the two graphs A4 and
A5 are due both to the difference in age groups (age 60 in the former case and 65 in the latter) and to the differenceiii
estimation timing. In fact the ISTAT figures updates the dependency rate forecast starting from year 1996
Source: Treasury Annual Report (Relazione Generale sulla Situazione Economica del Paese), 1996.
Source: L. Beltramelti (1996).
In 1993 households held, on average, 349 million Italian Lira in private wealth and 382 million Italian Lira
in pension wealth, corresponding, on average, to nine times and ten times the after-tax household income of that year.
Source: my own calculations based on Bank of Italy cross section data. USs I is equivalent to 1500 Italian Lira.
The choice of age groups is constrained by data availability. However these age-groups are consistent, for
nien, with the SS configuration which used to set the nonnal retirement age at 60.
There is a noticeable jump of all the series in Fig.2 (but also in Fig,t, though less sharp) in the year 1977.
This is due to a change in the definition of the labor force occurring in that year, which is described in more detail in
Appendix 1.
The choice of this wide age group is determined by the availability of data on Dl benefits recipients. In fact DI
benefits are not distinguished by age for every 55 flmd. It is possible to infer from the National Institute for SS-INPS
data (which is just a subset of the SS program, mainly excluding the public sector) that not many Dl benefits are paid
out before the age of 30, hence making this age the natural cutoff point. Alternatively I could have shown, for the
JNPS fund alone, the share of Dl receipients age 50 over the population age 50; however this provides a misleading
picture as in some years there was a disproportionate number of Dl benefits paid out to those self-employed in
agriculture.
50IL)
E.g.sonic people may claim a survivor benefit and an old-age pension, Unfortunately, I could not distinguish
in thispicture, between malesand females, because of lack of data.
In Section III explain how Dl benefits played the role of unemploymentlpoverty safely net until 1984, when a
tat. "as passed by Parliament. greatly limiling eligibility and increasing the frequency and quality of screening. To gel
a general pictere it could be added that, in 1992, Dl benefits paid by the INPS Administration (i.e. excluding the
public sector) covered approximately 7% of the resident population.
I also have the SS Data (INPS Archive) in panel form over 20 years, which is also described in Appendix I.
However, this latter data set only covers private sector employees and it is an unbalanced panel: in order to provide a
general description of the labor market I therefore opted for the Bank of Italy data. This also allowed me to present
sonic interesting comparisons between private sector and public sector employees pursued further in Appendix II.
There is a discrepancy between the line representing disability insurance recipients derived from this data
source and the one derived from official statistics (shown in Fig.4). First it should be noticed that Fig.4 refers to the
share of the population of age 30+ (both mates and females) receiving Dl benefits. Furthermore, aggregate data counts
the number of benefits and not the number of recipients. I have attempted the same calculation on micro data in
producing Fig. LU however, not every income earner reports her/his second or third pension even if they receite it and
the' do not always report receiving a DI benefit if they work. Finally, as I explain in Appendix I, the Bank of ltal
Data, which is a very rich data source, tends to slightly oversample wealthy households probably underestimating the
number of Dl. In an case, if I cumulate the share of DI benefit receipients from age t) onward I obtain approximately
the same result.
For the "retired" curve I only consider individuals receiving an old age SS benefit or an early relirenient 55
benefit, excluding all other 55 benefits, e.g. the "basic pension" (an income maintenance benefit).
Because I am excluding non-work related SS benefits (as explained in note 13 above) the share of women
receiving some benefits would be much higher (approximately 90%) at later ages, when women become more likely
to receive a survivor benefit or a basic pension.
Any sort of 55 benefit, even if not main source of income.
See note 15 above.
I am not describing the self-employed INPS Fund, although this had an interesting evolution and is becoming
of increasing importance.
I.e. an unfunded method of financing.
51The italian 55 system has had a major role in providing a safety net for low-income households both
explicitly (through special provisions which are part of the INPSAdministration.e.g. income maintenance provisions
to the needy and very otd) or implicitly through disability benefits. Though these income maintenance provisions are
not included in this study, they have certainly contributed to inflate the INPSbudgetand are relevant in explaining the
aggregate data.
I am referring to The Public Sector Employees Fundasone entity, but there are two major groups: Central
Government Employees and INPDAP(otherCivil Servants e.g. local Government Employees, teachers in primary
education etc..): this latter group was formerly known as the Treasury Fund.
Source: INPS. Le Pensioni domani, 1993,
There is no split between what is paid for old-age benefits vis-á-vis the other benefits.
US$ I is equivalent to 1500 Italian Lira. From now on I use Lit, in place of Italian Lira.
Retirement is non-mandatory, but individuals who intend to work beyond the normal retirement age are not
protected by the law. However, before the 1992 Reform a worker could postpone retirement (up to age 65 in the privale
sector) if this would allow him to complete 40 years' tax payments. The 1992 Reform encouraged workers to postpone
retirement (until age 65) even if 40 years' contributions had been completed by providing a slightly higher return iii
thebenefit computation formula. Claiming and receiving a pension are often separate events. The delays in paying
difterent tpes of benefits van: in most eases, benefits arc received one month later than the date of claim (the latter
usually coincides with the workers birthday).
However it should be added that normal retirement age for the public sector is (in the pre-1995 legislation) 63
for both sexes.
Allowance is made for special cases: e.g., maternity leave,
This is an index provided by the Central Statistical Office (ISTAT) in which weights applied to prices are
taken from a large sample of the Italian population based on a sampling frame of blue-collar aiid white-collar
employees (Indice dci prezzi al consumo per le famiglie di operai e impiegati).
Indexation to nominal wage started, for INPS-FPLD, in 1975: the legislation has changed several times in the
last few decades tending to extend this feature to more groups of the working population. The timing of indexation has
also changed several times: during the 70s it was done quarterly.
3tj Thisratio can be computed only since 1975,Thereforein Figure A7 I have also shown again the ratio of DI
benefits over total benefits for this sub-period (provided in Figure A6 for a longer spell) in order to draw a comparison.
52I have already described tinder the heading "55 tax" how this additional payroll tax mainly goes to the
National Health Service to provide health insurance for retirees.
U Income tax is paid on the 'FFRonlyabove a given minimum level. This lax-exempt level changes over lime
Hence the benefit is. (33%)*(adjustment factor)*(presenl value of SS taxes).
For example. [or someone retiring at age 62 in 1995 benefits in the transitional period were based on h%o
regimes as follows A weighted average of final sataries was computed by distinguishing two components: for a
portion the average of the last five years' real earnings and for a portion the last six years' real earnings (plus a
further six months). This average was the pensionable earnings measure. To this, a return of 2% per year (tip to a
maxiimim of 4(1 years) .as applied, provided pensionable earnings were below a given limit: a reduced rate
applied to earnings above the limit.
]t should be recalled that although retirement is non-niandatorv there is virtually no possibility of working
beyond age 65.
An alternative case is presented in which the post-1995 legislation (i.e. after the most recent reform of the
Italian Social Security System) is analyzed at the steady slate.
The prorota methodcorresponds to a benefit computation where the pre-1992 legislation applies to the
fraction of years for which the worker has been contributing tnider the old regime and the post-1992 legislation applies
to the remaining fraction. Hence, for our cohort, the effect of the new legislation is only felt for at most 6140ofthe
computational period. The 1995 Reform also entails a similar pro rata method starting in year 1996 for the transitional
period: this would be even tess relevant to the results of the base case simulation.
As explained in Part II. inflation is measured by the consumer price index, while real wage growth should be
measured by increases in contractual minimum wages. In alt the simulations I have adopted a l.5% real wage groth
and a 35% price growth. tn the eounterfacttial, where actual earnings are used, I have adopted real earnings groth in
the industrial sector up to 1995 and earnings growth equal to GDP growth afterwards.
It should be noted that the Italian tax system is progressive, highly non-linear and subject to marked changes
over the years: hence in general it would be inappropriate to simply extrapolate income taxes and rebates from one
year to the next. In practice. since I am assuming constant growth rates and a tax system which grows with the
economy in all relevant simulations, the after-income-tax benefits could be computed starting from real benefits as
well.
Source: 'Tavole di mortahta' per sesso e per eta', Anno 1985". ISTAT. Annuario Statistico Italiano, 1988.
5355 taxes in Italyare particularlyhigh (see Part II) and have also changed over the years.
As exptained in the previous section, special allowance is made for a dependent wife only in those cases
where the pension is topped tip to a minimum level and the retiree is allowed to receive earnings at a higher level than
in a single-household" case. In this exercise I have ignored the fact that a pension to survivors exists both during the
worker's active life and during retirement. The present simulation only accounts for the wife of the retiree claiming
benefils.
However, as t explained in Part 11, these rules would vary across different occupational groups within the
private sector.
The underestimation is generated by the difference in the compounded rates based on:
rl=l.5% + (0.75)*(3,5%) in each year, as opposed to r2= ((1.015)*(l.035)_l) in each year.
Strictly speaking this is nol a tax as the employer retains part of gross wage from his employees which is not
paid to any 55 fluid. However I call it TFR-tax for simplicity.
Notice that I am ignoring throughout the exercise an additional t).8% 55 tax paid by the employee as this
does riot have any corresponding benefit (see Pan II),
Although I am showing a computation carried out in one step, the actual computation in the simulation
requires Iwo separate steps, first taking out the SS tax and then income taxes which are highly non-linear.
Source: Own calculation on INPS (Istituto nazionale della Previdenz.a Sociale), OIM Workers Archive.
tu particular with the Bank of Italy cross sectional survey See Data Appendix for details
In particular. I have used a 1.5% annual rate both for real earnings growth and real GDP growth and a 3.5%
rate for annual inflation, Since these growth rates had been chosen for future projections, in order to obtain steady
earnings [also used the same rates in retrospective extrapolation - even if this resulted in gross underestimation of true
growth ligures. Government Actuaries have actually run future projections on the effects of the SS reform by making
use of a number of different scenarios. The motivation for the choice of parameters in this exercise is twofold: on the
one hand, adopting the same real growth rate both for GDP and earnings gives a simple benchniark; on the other
hand, there is evidence that in the last 20 years there has not been a marked difference, on average, between the two
rates (see also Rostagno, I 996b).
Si
Having completed 41) years' contributions to the system the retiree receives a first benefit of 0% of
pensionable earnings (i.e. a fraction of 2% for each year of contribution).
For the median worker of the base case the TFR benefit at retirement is roughly 23% of total net 55W.
54While the lath and 90th percentile were almost untouched by ite roof and floor of the SS system. the 5th and
95th percentilealmost invariablyhit these barriers: while these may be extreme cases, they arc useflul in describing
how these upper and minimum level operate.
This calibration procedure is designed so that an individual of age 62 in 1996 is indifferent between the pre-
reform and the post-reform regimes.
The Data Appendix provides a graphical representation of age-earnings profile for various cohorts of the
sample.
Thenormalretirement age gradually moves from 60 to 65 for lien. The early retirement option is available,
but public sector employees need 35 years contributions to become eligible in place of the previous 20 years (IS for
married women). In the public sector normal retirement age has been 65 throughout.
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7Table Al
Number OfPensions and Number of Workers for some Major 5.5. Funds,1993
Pensions Workers Ratio
(thousand) (thousand)
INPS-Total 14814 16345 0.91
Private SectorEmployees- FPLD 10141 11250 0.90
Self-employed 3634 4347 0.84
agriculture 2038 893 2.28
arts&crafts 816 l798 0.45
commerce 780 I655 0.47
OtherINPS 314 748 0.42
Public Sector Employees 2171 3776 0.57
Others 284 969 0.29Some key features of the
Table A2











transitional period 2032 2035
Pensionable earnings average of final five years'
real earnings (converted to
real values through price
index)
career average eanhings
(converted to real values
through price index +1%)
not applicable
pension benefit 2% (pensionable
earnings)*(l),
where "t" is the number of




where '1" is the number of
years in the system (at most
40 years)
annuity based on stock of
SS payroll tax. Past taxes
converted to real values
through nominal GDP
growth rate
cost of living plus real
earnings growth
pension to survivor 60% to spouse
20% to each child
40% to each child (if no
spouse)
swe same but 70% to lone child
+means-test
years of contributions for
eligibility
early retirement provision any age if 35 years' SS any age if 35 years' SS
taxes taxes
flexible within the window
normal retirement age
indexation of pension cost of living cost of living
IS 20Table A3
Eligibility Criteria for Retirement and Early Retirement
Pre-1992 Regime
PrivateSector Public Sector Self Employed
M F M F NI F
Oldagebenefit (age) 60 55 65 65 65 60
Earlyretirement 35 35 20 IS 35 35
(years oftaxpayments)
Post-1992Regime
PrivateSector Public Sector Self Employed
M F M F NI F
Oldagebenefit (age) 65 60 65 65 65 60
Earlyretirement 35 35 35 35 35 35
(yearsoftax payments)
Post-1995 Regime
PrivateSector Public Sector Self Employed
M F M F NI F
Old agebenefit (age) 57-65 57-65 57-65 57-65 57-65 57-65Table 1: Base Case Incentive Calculations
LastYear of Work Replacement RateSSW AccrualAccrual Rate Tax/Subsidy
54 -- 285353 0 0 0
55 0.726 280477 -4876 -0.017 0.245
56 0.744 274486 -5990 -0.021 0.308
57 0.761 268066 -6420 -0.023 0,338
58 0.780 261160 -6907 -0,026 0.372
59 0.798 253918 -7242 -0.028 0.401
60 0.799 241677 -12241 -0.048 0,697
61 0.804 229536 -12141 -0,050 0.711
62 0.805 217643 -11893 -0.052 0.718
63 0.805 205963 -11680 -0.054 0.729
64 0.809 194396 -11568 -0.056 0,746
65 0.809 183099 -11296 -0.058 0,756
66 0.809 172011 -11088 -0.061 0,772
67 0.809 161167 -10844 -0.063 0,787
68 0,809 150577 -10590 -0.066 0.803
69 0,809 140269 -10308 -0.068 0.818
Table 2: Incentive Calculations - Single Worker
Last Yearof Work
54
Replacement Rate SSW AccrualAccrual RateTax/Subsidy
-- 236380 0 0 0
55 0.735 230997 -5383 -0.023 0.282
56 0.736 225293 -5704 -0.025 0.301
57 0.754 219247 -6045 -0.027 0.326
58 0.773 212808 -6439 -0.029 0.356
59 0,791 206140 -6668 -0,031 0378
60 0.793 195449 -10691 -0.052 0.623
61 0.797 184917 -10532 -0.054 0.632
62 0.799 174681 -[0237 -0.055 0.633
63 0.799 164705 -9975 -0.057 0.638
64 0.803 154893 -9812 -0.060 0.648
65 0.803 145393 -9500 -0,061 0.651
66 0.803 136142 -9251 -0,064 0.660
67 0.803 127152 -8991 -0.066 0.668
68 0.803 118427 -8725 -0.069 0.677
69 0.803 109978 -8449 -0.071 0.687Table 3: Incentive Calculations -IncompleteEarnings History
Last Year of Work Replacement RateSSW Accrual Accrual RateTaxlSubsidy
54 -- 249356 0 0 0
55 0.638 245988 -3368 -0.014 0.169
56 0.656 241570-4418 -0.018 0.227
57 0.674 236698-4871 -0.020 0.257
58 0.692 231316-5382 -0.023 0.290
59 0.710 225575-5741 -0.025 0.318
60 0.729 219396 -6179 -0.027 0.352
61 0.751 212772 -6624 -0.030 0.388
62 0.770 205864 -6908 -0.032 0.417
63 0.788 198653 -7210 -0.035 0.450
64 0.809 191057 -7596 -0.038 0.490
65 0.809 179911 -11147 -0.058 0.746
66 0.809 168972 -10939 -0.061 0.762
67 0.809 158276 -10696 -0.063 0.776
68 0.809 147834 -10442 -0.066 0.792
69 0.809 137674 -10161 -0.069 0.807




-- 159881 0 0 0
55 -- 156914-2968 -0,019 0.149
56 -- 153398-3516 -0.022 0.181
57 0.463 152557-842 -0.005 0.044
58 0.482 151386-1170 -0.008 0.063
59 0.502 150151-1235 -0.008 0.068
60 0.523 149496-655 -0.004 0.037
61 0.547 148423-1073 -0.007 0.063
62 0.570 146543-1881 -0.013 0114
63 0.593 144000-2543 -0.017 0.159
64 0.622 140868-3132 -0.022 0.202
65 0.628 134420-6448 -0.046 0.432
66 0.634 127868-6553 -0.049 0.456
67 0.640 121318-6549 -0.051 0.475
68 0.646 114879-6439 -0.053 0.488




0.804 229536-12141 -0.050 0.711
Single Worker 0.797 184917-10532 -0.054 0.632
Incomplete History 0.751 212772-6624 -0.030 0.388
5th Percentile 1.357 87029-4382 -0.048 1.135
95th Percentile 0.580 408138-15660 -0.037 0.390
Post 1995 Regime 0.547 148423-1073 -0.007 0.063
Actual Earnings 0.840 165975-9613 -0.055 0,648
Table 6
Mean expected retirement age
Paneldata 1989-1995
Group 1989 1991 1993 1995
males young (1959-1974) 59.1960.06 59.89 61.14
males old (1922-1958) 60.2460.68 59.94 60.07
females young (1959-1974)56.5857,23 56.74 58.40
females old (1922-1958) 57.3057.93 57.90 59.17Table 7
Yearlychanges in expected male retirement age
Panel data 1989-1995.BaselineRegression: groups defined by age
Occupation Generation A yearsS. E.
Private Sector Employee 1 0.9570.358
Private Sector Employee 2 0.1970.194
Public Sector Employee 1 0.6440,673
Public Sector Employee 2 0.7560.297
Others 1 -0,0500.585
Others 2 0.4940.258
Generation =Iif years of tax payments in 1993 is <15
=2if years of tax payments in 1993 is ￿ IS
Hypothesis Tests:
(I) Private Sector Enipotyees of Generation IPublic Sector Empolyees of Generation I
(2) Private Sector Empolyces of Generation 2 =PublicSector Empolyees of Generation 2
Number of obs. =1895
H0 F Prob>F
(I) 0.17 0.680
(2) 2.49 0.115Table 8
Yearlychanges in expectedmale retirement age
Paneldata 1989-1995
Groups definedbyage
Occupation GenerationA years S. E.
Private Sector Employee 1 1.387 0.453
Private Sector Employee 2 0.254 0.253
Public Sector Employee I 0.792 0.831
Public Sector Employee 2 1.129 0.371
Others 1 -0.483 0.774
Others 2 0.762 0.305
Private Sector Employee in Year 1993 I 2.570* 0.910
Private Sector Employee in Year 1993 2 -0.567 0.469
Public Sector Employee in Year 1993 1 0.480 1.671
Public Sector Employee in Year 1993 2 -0.854 0.749
Others in Year 1993 I 0.963 1.444
Others in Year 1993 2 -1.295 0.777
Private Sector Employee in Year 1995 I 0.753 0.887
Private Sector Employee in Year 1995 2 0.442 0.527
Public Sector Employee in Year 1995 1 -1.792 1.805
Public Sector Employee in Year 1995 2 -1.434 0.845
Others in Year 1995 I 1.283 1.466
Others in Year 1995 2 -0.217 0.866
Number of obs. =1896
Generation =Iif years of tax payments in 1993 is CIS
=2if years of tax payments in 1993 is ￿ 15
Hypothesis Tests:
(1) Private Sector Empolyccs of Generation IPublic Sector Empolyees of Generation 1
(2) Private Scctor Empolyees of Generation 2 Public Sector Empolyecs of Generation 2
(3) Private Sector Empolyees in Year 1993 of Generation IPublic Sector Empolyees in Year 1993 of Generation I
(4) Private Sector Fmpolyees in Year 1993 of Generation 2Public Scctor Empolyecs in Year 1993 of Generation 2
(5)PrivateSector Empolyces in Year 1995 of Generation I =PublicSector Empolyees in Year 1995 of Generation I
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